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Abstract 
The purpose of this paper, by introducing the adjustment expense of global income 
transfers across N countries, is to produce an explicit rule for the planner country 
regarding income transfers, and to investigate the effects of income transfers on each 
country’s welfare. The findings are: (i) when country i has a productive advantage in 
producing public goods, country i becomes an income receiver; (ii) specifying the 
particular level of the adjustment expense for global income transfers, the planner can 
decide the values of income transfers for all countries; (iii) even though any country can 
become a planner of income transfers, all countries get the same utility level, while the 
low adjustment expense under a particular planner country leads to a Pareto-improving 
outcome; (iv) all conclusions are derived based on well-known information regarding the 
cost of producing public goods and income levels for all countries. 
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1. Introduction 
 Since Warr’s (1983) seminal work, a large body of literature has evolved on the 
neutrality result that the real equilibrium is unaffected by income transfers when public 
goods are privately provided. This framework is generalized and reinforced by giving the 
proof of existence and uniqueness of the equilibrium by Bergstrom et al. (1986, 1992). 
However, income transfers are not completely neutral in some cases.1 In one of these 
cases, Ihori (1996) investigates the welfare effects of changes in productivity differentials 
associated with the production of international public goods across countries.2 It is shown 
that an income transfer from a country with low productivity (i.e., a high cost of 
producing public goods) to a country with high productivity (i.e., a low cost) produces a 
Pareto improvement. His analysis on income transfers used a two-country model. 
 After Ihori (1996), Boadway and Hayashi (1999), Ihori (1999), Caplan et al. 
(2000), Itaya et al. (2002) and Kim and Shim (2006) investigate the effect of income 
transfer under productivity or population differentials, among others. They mainly 
investigate the effects of local income transfers between two countries, i.e., the effects 
between two countries in an N-country model. However, when they investigate the 
effects of global income transfers across N countries, the previous analysis between the 
two countries cannot answer the following questions. First, how are the different 
productivities among the N countries compared, and which countries among the N 
countries are income senders and income receivers? Second, when some countries are 
income receivers, how much do they receive? Third, which country manages the income 
transfer? To my knowledge, no papers investigate the effects of global income transfers 
across N countries with an explicit planner rule. 
 The purpose of this paper is to develop an explicit rule for the planner country of 
global income transfers among N countries, and to investigate the effects of income 
transfers on each country’s welfare, in order to answer the three questions above. We 
introduce the concept of adjustment expense for income transfers across countries. The 
finding for the first question is, when country i has a productive advantage in producing 
public goods, country i becomes an income receiver. The finding for the second question 
is, specifying the particular level of the adjustment expense, the planner can decide the 
size of income transfer for all countries. The finding for the third question is, even though 
any country can become the planner of income transfers, each country gets the same 
utility level, while the low adjustment expense under a particular planner country (the 
USA or the United Nations) leads to a Pareto improvement. All conclusions are derived 
based on well-known information on the cost of producing public goods and income 
levels for all countries. 
 The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 outlines the model with the 
noncooperative Cournot–Nash equilibrium of voluntary contributions to international 
public goods when global income transfers are implemented. Section 3 investigates the 
effects of global income transfers on national welfare under different productivities of the 
N countries, comparing the effects of local transfer between two countries. Section 4 
concludes the paper. 
                                                 
1 A useful survey in this field is Ihori (1996). 
2 Murdoch and Sandler(1986,p.84) consider the weapons with the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization’s (NATO) allies as the international public good and investigate its demand.. 
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2. The Model  
 Consider a model where there is one public good, one private good, and N 
countries (i = 1,2,…,N). Country i consumes an amount ix of the private good and 
provides an amount ig to the supply of the international public good. The total supply of 
international public good, G, is just the sum of ig provided by each country. Country i’s 
utility is given by ),( GxU ii  , where iU  is strictly increasing and quasi-concave, and 
ixandG  are normal goods for each country. Country i’s budget constraint is given by 
iiii ygpx  , where 0iy  is the exogenously given national income of country i and 
0ip  is the relative price (cost of production) of public goods in terms of private 
consumption in country i. As Ihori (1996) interpreted, low (high) ip  means a high (low) 
productivity in producing the public good. We also make the Cournot–Nash assumption 
that each country believes that the contributions of others are independent of its own. 
Then, we let 


ij
ji ggG denote the total public good, where 
ij
jg is the sum of 
jg provided by countries j other than i. 
Definition 1.   A Cournot–Nash equilibrium in this model is a vector of { *ig : i = l,...,N}, 
such that for each i, ),( ** ii gx  solves the following: 
 
 
.,..,2,1:
),(max
0,,..
*
,
Ni
ggxUU
iiiiii gxygpxts
ij
jiiii
igix




 (1) 
 
Each country consumes the same level of    ij ji gg *  at the equilibrium, which is a 
characteristic of the international public good. The solution to problem (1) yields the 
reaction function, which we can denote by ),,( *ij jiii gypg . The solution ig (i = 
1,2,…,N) satisfies Nigypgg
ij jiiii
...,,2,1,),,( **     at the equilibrium. Then, the 
solution ig in (1) can be written as ),...,,,....,( 2121 NNi yyypppg
  by substituting the other 
solutions into it. Furthermore, by inserting *ig  into the budget constraint, we get the 
solution of *ix . The existence and uniqueness of this solution is assumed here.
3 Because 
the reaction function ),,( *ij jiii gypg  derived from an unspecified utility function has a 
general form, the solution *ig is more general, and it is then difficult to investigate the 
                                                 
3 Miyakoshi (2008) tries to prove the existence and the uniqueness of this equilibrium. 
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effect of income transfers on country i’s utility. We use an alternative method, following 
Bergstrom et al. (1986, 1992). 
 Let us consider the maximization problem of a given country at a Cournot–Nash 
equilibrium in (1). We can reformulate (1) as follows, by adding   ij jg  on both sides 
of the budget equation: 
 
Definition 2.   A Cournot–Nash equilibrium in this model is such that for each i, ),( ** Gxi  
i = l,2,...,N, solves: 
 
 
.,..,2,1,0,0
,..
),(max
*
*
,
Ni
ij
ji
ij
jiiii
iiiGx
gGx
gpyGpxts
GxUU
i






  (2) 
 
In (2), each country implicitly chooses not only its supply *ig of international public 
goods, but also the equilibrium level of *G  itself. Each country consumes the same level 
of *G . The first order condition here is GUxUp iiii  // (i = 1,2,..,N). Utilizing the 
implicit theorem function, these N equations can be solved to give *ix (i = 1,2,…,N).
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 Based on Definition 2, we follow Ihori (1996), who uses the expenditure function 
to analyze the effect of the income transfers. We define the expenditure function at the 
Cournot–Nash equilibrium as follows: 
 
 ,),(..min,
 iiiiiiGx UGxUtsGpxEi  (3) 
 
where ),( *** GxUU iii  is the utility level at the equilibrium. Then, the expenditure 
function can be written as ),( * iiii pUEE  . At the equilibrium, this expenditure is equal 
to the income in (2): 
 
 


ij
jiiiii gpypUE
** ),( ,  (4) 
 
                                                 
4 G* is not decided. Warr (1983) sums the budget constraints of the N countries and then obtains 
G* under pi = 1 for all i. However, pi 1 in our model and then the equilibrium G*is derived in (6) 
and (7). 
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where the income on the right-hand side contains actual income yi and the externalities 
from the other country’s provision of the public good. By using Shephard’s Lemma on 
the expenditure function ),( * iii pUE  at the equilibrium, we can derive the following: 
 
 
***
*
),(,),(
),( GpUGpUG
p
pUE
iiiiii
i
iii 

, (5) 
 
where ),( * iii pUG  is the compensated demand function of country i for the international 
public good, which must equal the same level of *G for each country supported by this 
Lemma. From (4) and (5), the equilibrium can be summarized by the following 
equations: 
 
 
*
11
* )1(),( GNypUE
N
i
ii
N
i
iiii  



 , (6) 
 ),...,2,1(,),( ** NiGpUG iii  , (7) 
 
where j
N
ij
ii
N
i
PP    ,1  and multiplying (4) by i  and summing yields (6). 
These N+1 equations decide the utilities *iU of the N countries and the amount of the 
international public good *G at the equilibrium. This formulation is an extension of 
Ihori’s (1996) two-country model to N countries. 
 
 
3. Planner of Income Transfers: Local vs Global Transfers 
 
 We take the total derivatives of (6) and (7) consisting of N+1 equations: 
 
 



 
N
i
ii
N
i
iiUi dydGNUdE
1
*
1
* )1( , (8) 
 0**  dGUdG iiu ,    (i = 1,2,..,N), (9) 
 
where iUiiii EUpUE  ** /),(  and iUiiii GUpUG  ** /),( . By using 
**
11 dGUdG u   in (9), we can delete *dG from (8) and (9) and decrease the number of 
equations from N+1 to N. Moreover, by using the relationship of the expenditure function 
(3) in country 1, 
 
 UUU GpxE 1111  , (10) 
 
we can rewrite (8) and (9) as follows: 
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 



 
N
i
iiu
N
i
iiUiUU dyUdGNUdEUdGpx
1
*
11
2
**
11111 )1()( , (11) 
 0**  jjuiiu UdGUdG  , (i,j = 1,…,N), (12) 
 
We arrange equation (11) and (12) in vector and matrix format, 
 













 





























 




0
.
.
.
0
..
..
..
,...0,0,0,0
......................................................
......................................................
0,.............0,,,0
0.....,........0,0,,
.....,................,,))2((
1
*
*
2
*
1
)1(
32
21
221111
N
i
ii
NNUUN
UU
UU
NUNUUU dy
Ud
Ud
Ud
GG
GG
GG
EENGpx
, (13) 
 
where the determinant   of the matrix on the left hand side of (13) is: 
 
,)()())2((
))2((
1
2
2121111
211111111






N
i
NUjUUijiUiUNUUUU
UUU
GGGEGGGNGpx
GNGpx
(14) 
 
where 1211 , are sub-determinants of  . Because of (10), iUiiiUiiUi GpxE   . 
Inserting this relation into (14) yields: 
 
.)()()2(
)(
)()())2((
1
2
2121111
1
2
21
2121111












N
i
NUjUUijiUiUNUUUU
N
i
NUjUUijiUiU
NUUUNUUUU
GGGxGGGGpx
GGGxG
NGGGGGNGpx
 (15) 
 
The partial derivative of the compensated demand function, iUx  and iUG , is positive in 
terms of utility because they are normal goods. Then, the determinant   is positive. 
 
 
 
Local income transfers 
 The planner is interested in the local income transfer from country j to i under 
ij pp   , that is, in (13): 
 7
 ,.,0,0 jisallfordydydy sji   then, iji
N
i
ii dydy )(
1


  (16) 
The welfare effects of this transfer are derived using Cramer’s rule on (13): 
 0
)1)((
,0
)1)(( 2*2* 

 
ij
SU
N
jS
j
ij
i
j
ij
SU
N
iS
i
ij
i
i
pp
Gpp
dy
Ud
pp
Gpp
dy
Ud
 (17) 
 
We have derived the same effect of local income transfers as Ihori (1996) and others: a 
transfer from country j with low productivity (high price pj) of providing the public good 
to country i with high productivity (low price pi) improves welfare in both countries. 
 Here, we consider global income transfers among many countries by introducing 
the adjustment expense for income transfers, which to my knowledge has not been 
proposed yet. 
 
Global income transfers 
 We first design the planner of global income transfers, which is only one country 
among N countries. The planner country h takes a first linear approximation around the 
present utility level, and approximates the utility increase *hUd from the present level by 
using the income transfers and the partial derivatives of utility in terms of each country’s 
income (solved from (13)) as follows: 
 
.)/(),...,,(),...,,(.,.
)/(),...,,(),...,,(
1
*
21
*
2211
**
1
*
21
*
2211
*






N
i
iihNhNNhh
N
i
iihNhNNh
dyyUyyyUyyyyyyUUdei
yyUyyyUyyyyyyU
(18) 
 
Next, the planner country h maximizes the utility *hU  (or 
*
hUd ), which is already 
maximized under a given income of each country, by transferring income to each country. 
Here, prices are always fixed. However, the income transfers among the N countries 
involve an expense for making the agreement between the income senders and income 
receivers, or an administration expense. Then, the maximization problem of planner 
country h is formulated as follows: 
 
 
,~,0~..
,~~
2
1
2
1
1}
~{






N
j
i
N
i
i
N
i
ihihy
yyts
yaUMax
i
 (19) 
where 
 )..(0
.),(/,~,~ **
fixedconst
constyUadyyUdU ihhiiihh


  (20) 
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The first constraint in (19) means that the income transfers are implemented with fixed 
total income across the N countries. The second constraint means all income transfers are 
implemented with a given total expense 2 >0. The unit expense for 2~iy of the income 
transfer for any country i and for the positive transfer 0~ iy  (income receiver) and the 
negative transfer 0~ iy (income sender) equals one for the sake of simplicity. Finally, hia  
is derived from (13) as follows: 
 
   01*   SUN hSiihhi Gy
Ua      (i = 1,2,.h,.,N). (21) 
 
 Then, the Lagrange equation L and Kuhn-Tucker condition for (19) are as 
follows: 
 
 
 
,~0),,..,2,1(,0~2
)~()~0(~
1
1
22
1






N
i
iihi
N
i
i
N
i
ih
yNiya
yyUL


 (22) 
 0,0)~(,~
1
22
1
22  

 N
i
i
N
i
i yy . (23) 
 
The multiplier  is nonnegative and is depending on the exogenously given price 
parameters in (19). Note that  is zero when all pi are the same, while it is positive when 
all pi are not the same.5 Then,   can be solved as follows, inserting the first conditions 
into the second condition in (22) when  > 0, that is, all prices are not the same. We 
consider the case of  > 0, that is, all prices are not the same. Then, the second condition 
in (23) can be rewritten as 


N
i
iy
1
22 ~ . By using the resolved  , we get iy~ . 
                                                 
5 When  > 0,  can be solved in (24) where all prices are not the same. If all prices are the same, 
hia  are the same for all i because of (21) and then  in (24) is zero. Conversely, when all prices 
are not the same (at least one is different) and then at least one hia  for i is different in (21), 
0 hia  for i and then  > 0 and 0~ iy  in the first condition in (22). Similarly, we assume 
that all prices are the same and then hia  for all i is the same as in (21). Aggregating the first 
condition and using the second condition in (22), we can get 
0~2
111
 

 NayNa N
i
hi
N
i
i
N
i
hi . Then, because hia  is the same for all i, 
hia  for all i , which means  = 0 (in which case iy~  are not determined for all i) or iy~  = 0 for 
all i in (22). 
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 ).1(
2
1~,1,0
2 111



N
i
hihii
N
i
hi
N
i
hi a
N
aya
N
a

  (24) 
 
On the other hand, by inserting iy~  in (24) into the second condition in (23),   can be 
solved as follows: 
 
  
  2
)1(
1
2
1
 
 


N
i
N
i
hihi aN
a
. (25) 
  
 
Finally we get Nyyy ~,...,~,~ 21 as follows, by inserting (25) into (24). 
 
 
 

 




 

N
i
N
i
hihi
N
i
hihj
j
a
N
a
a
N
a
y
1
2
1
1
)1(
1
~

,       (j = 1,2,.h,.,N). (26) 
 
 
 
Then, by inserting (21) into (26), we can get the following solution { jy~ }: 
 
 

 

 



 






 




 


N
i
N
i
ii
N
i
ij
N
i
N
i
hihi
N
i
ij
SU
N
hS
j
N
N
a
N
a
N
G
y
1
2
1
1
1
2
1
1
)1(
1
)1(
1
~

,  (j = 1,2,.h,.,N).(27) 
 
We can easily confirm that the solution satisfies the conditions in (22) and (23). 
  If the planner can get more information about },...,,{)( 211 NUUUU GGGandforx  , 
the optimal utility level of country h is solved by inserting (27) into (19): 
 
  
 


 






 


 

N
j N
j
N
i
ij
N
i
ij
SU
N
hSjh
N
N
GUd
1
1
2
1
1*
1
1
1

. (28) 
 
We approximate the utility level of the other country T under the planner country h by 
using (18). Then, inserting (27) into (18) we have: 
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  
 


 






 


 

N
j N
j
N
i
ij
N
i
ij
SU
N
TSjT
N
N
GUd
1
1
2
1
1*
1
1
1

. (29) 
 
Here, when the planner is changed from country h to country T, the optimal utility level 
of country T is the one replacing SU
N
hS G  with SUN TS G  in (28), which is the same as 
that in (29). That is, even though any country can become the planner of income transfers, 
each country gets the same maximum utility level, iUd . It is because the optimal income 
transfers do not depend on the planner as shown in (27).  Moreover, when the unit 
adjustment expense for income transfers is decreased from one by a planner country with 
strong political power, that is, the  in (19) increases, the utility levels for all countries 
increase, showing a Pareto improvement. In this sense, the United Nations or the US may 
be appropriate for a planner. If it is the United Nations, it decides the unit expense (then 
) and the optimal income transfers in (27).  
 Following the planner country h, which manages the global income transfers 
across all countries, we obtain the following policy conclusions. 
(i) Because of (27), when the cross product of costs except for the cost of 
country j ( j ) is larger than the average cross product of costs except for 
one country ( 


N
i
iN 1
1 ), (this positive difference is called the productive 
advantage of country j), country j is an income receiver ( jy~ >0). 
(ii) Because of (27), specifying the particular level of the adjustment expense ζ, 
the planner can decide the size of income transfers for all countries. 
(iii) Because of the rule of the planner country h in (19) and the solution in (27), 
even though any country can become the planner, these conclusions hold, 
moreover because of (29), each country gets the same utility level. It does 
not matter which country becomes the planner. However, when the unit 
adjustment expense for income transfers is decreased from one by a planner 
country with strong political power, the utility levels for all countries 
increase, creating a Pareto improvement. 
(iv) All conclusions are derived based on well-known information on the cost pi 
of producing public goods, and the income level yi for all countries. 
 
An illustration of global income transfers 
 We provide an illustration of the planner’s rule using the example of N = 2. 
Because of (19), the maximization problem of a planner country 1 is as follows: 
 
 ,~~
~
2121111}~,~{ 21
yayaUMax
yy
  (30) 
 ,0~~.. 21  yyts  (31) 
 .~~ 222
2
1  yy  (32) 
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Moreover, because of (21): 
 
     ,01,01 22122111   UU GaGa  and 1221 , pp   . (33) 
 
Then, the objective function in (30) can be rewritten, by using (33), as follows: 
     01:~~~~1~ 22112211221  UU GAypypAypypGU . (34) 
 
The maximization program (34), (31) and (32) is illustrated using Figure 1. 
 
Insert Figure 1 
 
The objective function (34) and constraints (31) and (32) are depicted in Figure 1, where 
the term APU 11 /
~  shows the utility level, constraint (31) is the solid line and constraint 
(32) is the region within the circle. In the case of 21 PP  , the objective function (34) 
coincides with the constraint (31), and then the optimum transfers are on the constraint 
(31) and within (32),but it is not uniquely decided. The optimum utility level is zero. 
These findings are already shown in footnote 4. 
 In the case of 21 PP  , the objective function (34) with 21 PP   obtains the 
maximum utility for planner country 1 at point C. The optimum income transfer exists at 
point C* with 0~1 y  and 0~2 y  and the utility level is    2112 ~~ ypypA . If there is no 
constraint (32), the optimal income transfer 0~1 y  endlessly decreases to obtain the 
maximum utility level, by moving upwards on the line (31). This formulation of 
maximization without (32) is used in previous studies. On the other hand, the non-planner 
country 2 has obtained their utility level by receiving income from planner country 1:    2112 ~~ ypypB  where  /1UGB . If country 2 becomes the planner, its objective 
function is  2112 ~~ ypypB   where  /1UGB  . When 21 PP  , the optimal income 
transfer is given at point C* by using Figure 1 and its utility level is    2112 ~~ ypypB . 
The utility level for the planner country 2 is the same as that of the non-planner country 2. 
The reason is as follows. The optimal transfers are decided only by the constraints (31) 
and (32). Moreover, the increase in the utility is approximated by a linear function of the 
income transfers of all countries and then, whichever country become the planner, this 
country necessarily obtains the intersection of two constraints (31) and (32). Finally, 
when the unit adjustment expense of income transfers increases, constraint (32) becomes 
larger and the utility for each country increases. 
 
 
4. Concluding Remarks 
 We have pointed out three problems regarding local income transfers. First, how 
are the different productivities among N countries compared, and which countries among 
the N countries are income senders and income receivers? Second, when some countries 
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are income receivers, how much do they receive? Third, which country manages the 
income transfers? To resolve these issues, this paper proposes a planner of global income 
transfers and finds the optimal global income transfers for all countries. Only one planner, 
country h among the N countries, maximizes its utility, which is already maximized given 
the income levels of all countries, by transferring income to each country for a fixed 
adjustment expense. The income transfers among countries involve a fixed adjustment 
expense ζ for forming agreements among income-sender and income-receiver countries. 
 Using a planner country h, which manages global income transfers across all 
countries, we obtain the following policy conclusions. 
 
(a) The finding for the first problem is, when country i has a productive advantage in 
producing the international public good, country i becomes an income receiver. 
(b) The finding for the second problem is, specifying the particular level of the 
adjustment expense ζ, the planner country can decide the size of income transfers 
for all countries. 
(c) The finding for the third problem is, even though any country can become a 
planner of income transfers, these conclusions hold. Whichever country becomes 
a planner, each country gets the same utility level. However, when the unit 
adjustment expense for income transfers is decreased from one by a planner 
country (the United Nations or the US) with strong political power, the utility 
levels for all countries increase, creating a Pareto improvement. 
(d) All conclusions are derived based on well-known information on the cost of 
producing public goods and income levels for all countries. 
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 Figure 1. N = 2 
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